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This article examine how firms manage earnings when firms are in interconnected networks, that is, when 
firms are interconnected to each other in a way that the survival of one firm is crucial to the survival of 
other firms connected to it. The article employs network typology to provide some insight on the earnings 
management behaviour of firms in regulated and unregulated networks or systems. We find that firms in 
the inner core of interconnected networks are more likely to rely on income smoothing behaviour as a 
preferred form of earnings management because it stabilizes the firm’s link with other firms in the 
network. In regulated networks, we propose a negative relationship between a firm’s network centrality 
and the number of earnings management strategies the manager can adopt. Also, we propose a positive 
relationship between a firm’s network centrality and the propensity to smooth earnings or income when 
firms are concerned about their reputation or regulatory scrutiny. This article is a brief note on earnings 
management, and an attempt provide a perspective on how earnings management can be explained using 
a network typology.  
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1. Introduction 
We explore earnings management among interconnected firms to provide insights on how firms might 
manage earnings when they are interconnected by networks. By interconnections, we mean firms that are 
interconnected with each other in a way that the survival of one firm is crucial to the survival of other 
firms connected to it. A real-life example would be the case of banks in the global banking system. Banks 
became interconnected to each other long before the 2007-2008 financial crisis, and were also connected 
to large non-financial firms that depended on banks. After the financial crisis, national and global bank 
supervisors now think of banks and banking supervision in terms of ‘networks’ or ‘financial networks’ or 
‘interconnectedness’ (Haldane, 2013). This idea that firms exist in highly interconnected and complex 
networks led to the emergence of studies that investigate the characteristics and behaviour of firms that 
are interconnected by financial networks.  
Indeed, serious concern for financial instability in several countries have also led to a boom of papers on 
financial networks to improve financial stability. One of the major concerns in these debates is systemic 
risk, and network typology has been used to understand systemic risk (Allen and Gale, 2000; Markose, 
2012; Battiston et al, 2012). Yet, little is known about the network typology of similar financial reporting 
practices between firms which can contribute to systemic risk, and little is also known about how similar 
accounting choice by connected firms contribute to propagate network-style contagion, leading to 
systemic risk. To the best of our knowledge, the network topology of earnings management in financial 
reporting has so far not been studied.  
Our study applies the idea of networks to propose and develop a framework that explains the earnings 
management behaviour of firms when firms are part of an interconnected network. We build on network 
topology from the financial network literature to develop a framework that explains the earnings 
management behaviour of firms when firms are part of a fragile and complex financial network. So far, 
there is much evidence that firms manage reported earnings to meet several financial reporting objectives 
(e.g. Bouvatier et al, 2014; Cohen et al, 2014; Ozili, 2017), however, it is not clear how firms manage 
earnings when firms are considered to be interconnected. There is scant knowledge on network-based 
approach to understand earnings management particularly among interconnected firms, therefore, our 
discussion in this paper contributes to the earnings management literature by showing how a network 
perspective of accounting choice can provide insights to understand the earnings management behaviour 
of interconnected firms. We provide a perspective and conclude that firms in the core periphery of highly-
interconnected (or complex) networks are more likely to engage in income smoothing as a type of 
earnings management behaviour relative to firms in the outer periphery in the network, and this behaviour 
varies with the network-centrality of firms in the network.  
Our contribution to the literature is two-fold. First, our discussion in this article contribute to the financial 
network literature by providing insights on the financial reporting behaviour of firms in financial 
networks. We point out that the earnings management behaviour of firms in connected networks will be 
driven by firms’ knowledge of their position in the network. Secondly, our study contributes to the 
earnings management literature by providing another way to think about earnings management among 
interconnected firms. Finally, we are aware that accounting standard-setters want to understand the 
earnings management practices of systemic or ‘highly-interconnected’ firms. Insights from the framework 
developed in this paper can guide and inform future standard-setting policies on the financial reporting 
practices of systemic financial and non-financial institutions.  
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the literature review on networks 
and earnings management. Section 3 provides a conceptual framework on networks. Section 4 develops 
the network-based earnings management framework. Section 5 concludes. Throughout the paper, we use 
the term ‘income smoothing’, ‘profit smoothing’ and ‘earnings smoothing’ interchangeably to mean the 
same thing.  
 
2. Literature Review  
2.1. Networks 
Network typology has been used to describe modern real-world financial systems in the literature. For 
instance, Boss et al (2004) use network topology to examine the Austrian interbank market. Nagurney and 
Ke (2001) examine financial networks in financial intermediation. Boginski et al (2005) applied network 
analysis to stock markets. Iori et al (2008) applied the concept of networks to describe the Italian 
overnight money market and find evidence for increasing network-interconnectedness but decreasing 
network strength while Haldane (2013) provides a characterisation of the world’s financial network. 
Markose (2012) use financial network typology to provide a firm level bottom-up holistic visualization of 
the interconnection of financial obligations in global OTC derivatives market.  
In the theoretical literature, financial networks are considered to be beneficial for risk-sharing and/or loss-
sharing among interconnected firms although they also facilitate the propagation of contagion. For 
instance, Allen and Gale (2000) investigate the resilience to shocks in a stylized four-bank network. They 
sought to understand how banking systems respond to contagion when banks are interconnected under 
different network structures. They demonstrate that complete networks, in which every bank is connected 
to every other bank, are more resilient due to risk-sharing among firms (or agents) while incomplete 
networks, in which every bank is connected with fewer than all banks, are more fragile; therefore, less-
interconnected banks will have difficulty to absorb shocks to the financial system 
Nier et al (2007) investigate the resilience of financial networks to shocks and find that contagious bank 
defaults spreads in highly interconnected bank networks. They also observe that at small levels of 
connectivity, a small increase in interconnectedness increases the likelihood of contagion while higher 
connectivity in more connected networks improves the ability of the financial system to absorb shocks 
through risk-sharing. Gai and Kapadia (2010) show that the likelihood of contagion in less-interconnected 
networks is low but when events that initiates the propagation of contagion sets in, the impact can be 
widespread. Interestingly, they observe that aggregate shocks will have different impact on the financial 
system depending on the importance of the affected nodes (banks) in the financial network. This means 
that a shock that affects a highly connected bank will have serious consequences on the overall system 
compared to the same shock that affects a less connected bank. Amini et al (2016) show that institutions 
which contribute most to network instability have both large interconnections and a large fraction of 
contagious links. Acemoglu et al (2013) find that although complete networks are generally more stable 
under extreme conditions, the high number of interconnections are responsible for higher fragility in 
financial networks. Sachs (2014) use simulation approach to investigate the impact of the structure of the 
matrix of interbank liabilities on financial stability1 , and find that financial stability depends on both the 
                                                          
1 Sachs (2014) characterised the financial system according to the number of banks, total assets in the banking 
completeness of the network, the interconnectedness of the network and the distribution of interbank 
exposures within the system, that is, the distribution of financial claims within the system. Leitner (2005) 
applied financial networks to design an optimal financial network that minimise the trade-off between 
risk-sharing and the contagion (that is, the potential for collapse) in relation to investment decisions of a 
firm.2 Interestingly, Leitner (2005)’s model show that financial networks (linkages or interconnections) 
are desirable when they act as channels for contagion because they can motivate banks to bail-out each 
other if banks can coordinate to do so when contagion arises. While Leitner (2005)’s argument that banks 
can bail-out each other is interesting, it is important to stress that a bank will bail-out other banks only 
when the bank itself is not under financial distress, implying that a bank will rationally save itself first 
before saving another bank. Battiston et al (2012) investigate the association between interconnectedness 
and systemic risk in a model of the economy as a credit network. They show that although higher 
interconnections improve risk-sharing, it also amplifies the current economic recession or boom.3 
Acharya and Richardson (2009) oppose risk-sharing emanating from systemic firms, and rather argue that 
systemic banks should internalize the risk they pose to the financial system. Acemoglu et al (2015) 
examine the relationship between the financial network architecture and the likelihood of systemic 
failures due to contagion of counterparty risk. They show that as long as the magnitude and the number of 
negative shocks affecting financial institutions are sufficiently small, more complete interconnections (i.e. 
interbank claims) will enhance stability in the system up at a certain point beyond which such 
interconnections start to serve as a mechanism to propagate shocks which leads to a more fragile financial 
system.  
Furthermore, Castiglionesi and Navarro (2008) develop a model to study the endogenous formation of a 
financial network or banking network, and find that banks voluntarily form networks among themselves 
because it allows them to co-insure future and uncertain liquidity needs, implying that financial networks 
provide liquidity co-insurance for connected banks because it represent the lines of credit that banks grant 
to each other.4 Afonso et al (2011) also stress that, when the risk associated with the lending of funds is 
too high, interconnections become too costly compared to the benefits they bring and safe banks will 
sever their financial links to eliminate troubled banks so that safe banks will continue to be linked to, and 
insure, other safe banks. Also, Gofman (2017) show that during crisis periods, stability in financial 
networks can be improved with higher liquidity requirements and when failed banks’ depositors maintain 
confidence in the banking system. Cabrales et al (2015) show that in financial networks, contagion 
spreads if a shock to one market is transmitted to other markets due to information revealed in the first 
market. They show that financial contagion depends not only on the network structure but also on firms’ 
knowledge and beliefs about the network structure.  
2.2. Earnings Management  
                                                          
system, equity ratio, the ratio of interbank to total assets and loss given default; 
2 2 Leitner construct a model where the success of an agent’s investment in a project depends on the investments 
of other agents linked to the agent’s project. Leitner was particularly interested to design an optimal financial 
networks that minimise the trade-off between risk-sharing and contagion (that is, the potential for collapse). 
3 Battiston et al. (2012) explain that when an economic agent suffers a negative shock, counterparties to the 
economic agent react by withdrawing from existing trade deals or refusing to engage in trade deals with the 
economic agent. This further makes economic conditions harder for the economic agent, hence, financial fragility 
amplifies the current state of agents in the economy 
4 While interconnections provide liquidity insurance among connected firms, it also creates counterparty risk 
The earnings management literature, on the other hand, show that firms can manipulate reported earnings 
using accrual and real techniques or a combination of both techniques (Gunny, 2005; Zang, 2011) and the 
components of accruals that is manipulated vary by firm context and in predictable ways for firms in 
some industries (Marquardt and Wiedman, 2004). Firms use a combination of accrual or real techniques 
to manage reported earnings to: avoid reporting a loss or loss avoidance ( Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; 
DeGeorge et al., 1999); to engage in income-increasing earnings management (Rangan, 1998; Barth et al., 
1999), to smooth reported earnings over time (LapointeAntunes et al., 2006; Ozili, 2015 & 2017), 
amongst others. Given the portfolio of earnings management strategies available to managers in industrial 
and financial firms, the common accounting procedures (and accounting numbers) used to manage 
earnings include: changes to pension assumptions, inventory methods, depreciation method and estimates 
(Sweeney, 1994); available-for-sale securities (Barth et al., 2016); loan loss provisions (Ozili, 2015, 
2017); gains from the timing of asset sales (Hermann et al., 2003); pension costs (Bergstresser and 
Phillipon, 2006); reduction in advertising and R&D expense (Gunny, 2005; Cohen et al., 2010); use of 
sales discounts (Roychowdhury, 2006); inventory overproduction (Thomas and Zhang, 2002; 
Roychowdhury, 2006); stock repurchase (Hribar et al., 2006); derivative hedging (Barton, 2001; Pincus 
and Rajgopal, 2002); and securitization (Dechow and Shakespeare, 2009; Dechow et al., 2010). To date, 
the literature does not explain how firms might manage earnings when firms are considered to be 
interconnected. The scant knowledge about network-based approach to earnings management particularly 
among interconnected firms, therefore, makes our study relevant within the broad earnings management 
literature. 
 
3. Conceptual Framework  
3.1. Evolution of Network Theory  
Herbert Simon did a classic study “The Architecture of Complexity”. Building upon a wide spectrum of 
systems thinking from the physical sciences, biological sciences and social sciences, Herbert Simon 
(1991) evaluate the resilience and evolution of complex systems. To summarise, Simon (1991) show that 
complexity in a system is explained in terms of hierarchy or hierarchical systems. By hierarchy, he meant 
a system composed of interrelated subsystems with each subsystem being composed of interrelated sub-
subsystems until we reach the lowest level of subsystem with the most basic or simple structure 
(paraphrased). On theoretical grounds, Herbert show that complex systems evolve from basic simplicity 
into hierarchies (that is, interrelated subsystems) and each hierarchy has a near-decomposability property. 
A near-decomposability property implies that each subsystem can be decomposed into its smallest and 
basic structure to make it easier to understand how the complex system evolved, and to understand the 
dynamics of the complexity in the system.  
3.2. Network Typology and Complexity  
3.2.1. Network Typology “Networks are defined by a pair of sets (N, E) that stand for the finite set of 
nodes N = {1, 2, 3… n}, and E is a set of edges” (Markose, 2012, p.633). Networks are simply 
interconnected nodes where nodes stand for entities such as firms while the edges or connective links in 
the network represents contractual flows of claims and obligations among firms in the network. Similarly, 
in financial networks, nodes stand for financial entities such as banks, other financial intermediaries, and 
their non-financial customers and the edges or connective links represent contractual flows of liquidity 
and/or obligations to make payments and receive payments (Markose, 2012 paraphrased). Networks are 
interconnection between two or more nodes such that the presence of networks in a system is captured by 
the interdependence of two or more nodes on each other.5 Over time, networks grow and become 
complex. By complex, we mean the interconnection between nodes (firms) will grow and the interaction 
between them will become complex over time due to increasing volume of financial claims and 
obligations6 among firms in the network, and financial obligations or claims refer to the formal and/or 
informal contract that binds two or more counterparties in a financial transaction to fulfil the terms of the 
contract.7 In a nutshell, networks represent the interconnection of financial and non-financial obligations 
or claims across firms in a connected system and these obligations and claims across firms will grow, 
over time, and become complex. So, what is complexity?  
3.2.2. Complexity  
Jepson (2001) define complexity as the property of a model that makes it difficult to formulate its overall 
behaviour in a given language, even when given reasonably complete information about its components 
and their interrelations.8 In banking regulation, for instance, the complexity of the financial system that 
led to the 2007 to 2008 financial crisis arose mainly from the ambiguous securitisation activities of 
financial and non-financial institutions with each other. While complexity can be reduced to its most basic 
form if complexity can be quantified, however, the science of quantifying the complexity of financial 
systems is often difficult. To reduce complexity in a highly-connected (or complex) network, the starting 
point is to first identify the simplest structure in the network. In financial networks, for instance, the 
simplest structure in any complex financial system/network is the flow of obligations or claims between 
two firms: firm A and firm B. Over time, firm A will enter into contractual transactions that yield claims 
and obligations with other firms and the latter will enter into similar or dissimilar contractual obligations 
with other firms in the system until each firm becomes linked to one another by claims and obligations 
they did not directly engage in. This process continues until each firm become highly-interconnected (via 
networks) to other firms in the system. This describes how complexity builds up into the system, leading 
to complex interconnection among firms.9  
                                                          
5 Networks also have wide applications in several field of study. In sociology, for instance, social network theory 
explains the behaviour of agents in complex systems in the sense that individuals are embedded in thick webs of 
social relationships and interactions, and autonomous individuals are able to work together to create an enduring 
and well-functioning society (see Freeman et al, 1979; Borgatti et al, 2009). In strategic management and 
organisational studies, the concept of networks shows the interaction within and between organisations as well as 
the interaction of organisations with the open environment (see Thorelli, 1986; O'Reilly and Finnegan, 2010). In 
the marketing discipline, the concept of networks is used to analyse product adoption decisions (see Aral and 
Walker, 2011; Choi et al, 2010). In the industrial organisation literature, the concept of networks is used to explain 
the behaviour of research and development expenditure (see Goyal and Moraga-Gonzales, 2001; König et al, 
2012). In the economics and finance, the concept of networks is employed to understand financial contagion 
among financial institutions (see Von Peter, 2007; Soramaki et al, 2007). 
6 Flow of payments, for example in financial firms, represent obligations or claims such as credit default swaps, 
letters of credit, negotiable certificate of deposits, loans, etc. 
7 Gai et al (2011) view financial networks as consisting of a number of banks randomly interlinked by their claims 
on one another with each bank represented by a node on the network. 
8 From a sociology perspective, complexity may arise from the interaction among multiple actors (individuals, 
organizations, etc.) which leads to the emergence of patterns that makes it difficult to predict behaviour even 
when the simple and basic rules of interaction are known. 
9 For banks, for instance, Shin (2009) points out that securitisation activities by banks increased the complexity 
3.3. Contagion and Networks 
Contagion in networks can occur when unexpected, abnormal and severe shock to the system spreads 
across fragile networks such that if the shock leads to the failure of one firm, the likelihood of failure of 
other firms connected to it increases. For instance, in financial networks, Freixas et al (2000) and Brusco 
and Castiglionesi (2007) show that higher levels of interconnection among firms improves the resilience 
of financial networks to withstand financial contagion.10 They argue that higher interconnection in 
networks improves risk-sharing among firms in the network by easily absorbing shocks when they occur, 
however, higher-interconnection in networks can also lead to contagion because shocks spread quickly in 
a web of highly-interconnected networks. Also, the rate at which contagion spreads depend largely on 
how quickly agents (or firms) in the network react to information particularly bad news (see. 
Castiglionesi, 2007). Therefore, in a complex network, contagion convey the idea that the failure of an 
interconnected firm to meet its obligation will send shocks that trigger panic to other firms connected to 
it, implying that contagion spreads quickly in highly connected networks.  
3.4. Firm’s positioning in a Complex Network 
A complex network has a core (inner) periphery and a non-core (outer) periphery, and this fact has been 
articulated by several studies that examine financial networks (see. Soramäki et al, 2007; Inaoka et al, 
2004; Boss et al, 2004, etc.). Firms in the core periphery are highly inter-linked by claims and obligations 
of multiple counterparties (i.e. other firms) in the system relative to firms in the outer periphery, implying 
that firms positioned in the outer periphery in a complex network have lesser interconnection (i.e., flow of 
claims and obligation) with other firms while firms positioned in the inner core periphery have more 
complex interconnection (flow of claims and obligations) with other firms in the network. Allen and 
Babus (2008) posit that firms (banks) at the core periphery perform better than firms (banks) in the outer 
periphery because certain network structures bring some benefits that well-positioned firms (banks) in the 
network are able to exploit to take full advantage of such benefits. Hochberg et al (2007) examine venture 
capital firms that are interconnected by a network of syndicated portfolio company investments. They 
find that better-networked venture capital firms have  
 
4. Network-Based Earnings Management Framework 
So far, there is yet no literature that explains managerial financial reporting discretion among firms that 
are considered to operate as interconnected networks. Also, the literature is relatively silent about the 
financial reporting behaviour of agents (managers of firms) in the network. In this section, we analyse the 
                                                          
of the financial system by lengthening the intermediation chain (or networks) in the financial system just before 
the 2008 financial crisis began. The magnitude of the 2008 financial crisis revealed how fragile the global 
financial network was, at that time. 
10 The use of a network approach to understand the financial contagion among financial institutions across several 
countries became more pronounced in the literature after the 2008 financial crisis (see Garratt et al, 2011; Kubelec 
and Sa, 2012; Glasserman and Young, 2015; Gai et al, 2011), while the use of network topology to study financial 
contagion is at its infancy in the economics and finance literature (Haldane and May, 2011), and the network 
typology is relatively silent about the behaviour of agents in the network (Gai et al, 2011). 
possible financial reporting behaviour of managers of interconnected firms. To begin, we make some 
assumption11, and we assume that these propositions hold true. 
 4.1. Assumptions 
1. There are firms in an endogenous network. 
2. Over time, the network evolves from a simple structure to a more complex structure consisting of a 
core (inner) and non-core (outer) periphery, implying that there are firms in the core (inner) periphery and 
firms in the non-core (outer) outer periphery. 
3. Every firm is connected to at least one firm, and the manager of each firm is aware of the 
interconnection between his firm and other firms connected to it, and the manager is also aware of the 
interaction among them.  
4. To participate in the network, firms will anticipate the costs and benefits of participating in the network 
and make a decision to join or not to join. This implies that managers will undertake some cost-benefit 
analysis of interconnections with other firms. Also, firms that have existing connections with other firms 
will continuously re-evaluate the cost and benefit of their existing connection to make a ‘remain or 
disconnect’ decision.  
5. Managers of firms in the network are highly sensitive to the actions of firms that are most 
interconnected to them and are less sensitive to the actions of firms that are less connected to them.  
6. A highly-connected firm in a network will take actions to ensure the survival and stability of the firm if 
such action leads to the survival and stability of other firms connected to it since its survival depends on 
the survival of others. Interconnected firms whose survival depends on the stability of the entire system 
will have strong incentive to pursue stability objectives rather than engage in aggressive competition. 
However, if there is competition among interconnected firms, competition in the network will motivate 
interconnected firms (and their managers) to take actions that will make their firm appear stable to avoid 
losing their connection with valuable firms who are quick to de-link themselves from ‘distressed’ or 
‘unstable’ firms, as a competitive strategy.  
7. Managers in the network have discretion to adopt certain accounting techniques in financial reporting, 
and the choice of accounting technique adopted by a manager may depend on the accounting technique 
adopted by other firms in the network.  
8. Regulators are aware of the network-like structure among firms in the industry  
9. The objective of regulation introduced by industry regulators in complex networks or systems is to 
ensure stability in the network-system and to ensure the resilience of the network. 
 
Managers of firms in the core periphery of the network will have incentives to take actions that promote 
the stability and survival of the firm as well as the survival of other firms connected to it if the manager 
believe that the firm’s survival is linked to the survival of other firms in the interconnected system despite 
the competition among firms in the system. Similarly, firms in the noncore (outer) periphery that are 
                                                          
11 Every framework and/or theory in every discipline has some underlying assumptions 
connected to firms in the core periphery will take similar or dissimilar actions to promote their survival 
and stability in the interconnected system as well. Even in the absence of shocks that propagate contagion 
in the network, managers of firms in the core-periphery will take actions that ensure, and reinforce, the 
stability and survival of the firm and other firms connected to it.  
One simple way to improve the survival and stability of firms in the core-periphery is to ensure that such 
firms remain profitable which can be achieved through income-increasing or income-smoothing or loss-
reducing strategies. This is because managers of firms in the core-periphery understand that reporting 
losses sends a bad signal to other firms connected to it, and managers of such firms will seek to avoid 
sending such bad signal. Hence, these managers will have some incentive to use accounting (and non-
accounting) techniques to manage reported earnings to improve the firm’s profitability and performance. 
By remaining profitable, the risk of panics and shocks that amplifies contagion following the reporting of 
unexpected and massive losses, is reduced significantly. Moreover, when multiple firms in the core 
periphery use accounting and non-accounting techniques to alter earnings to appear profitable or to appear 
stable, there will be a complex web of earning management activities going on in the network aimed at 
improving the stability position or profitability of firms in the core periphery in the network. 
Furthermore, managers of firms in the core periphery will pay close attention to how their earnings 
management choices affects the balance sheet of firms that are closely connected to them12 - that is, other 
firms that hold majority of the firm’s (financial and non-financial) claims as well as firms it owe most 
(financial and non-financial) obligations. For instance, when interconnected firms report significant 
losses, such losses could send a signal that firms in the core periphery are gambling with the claims of 
firms connected to them. In response to this, counterparty firms may decide to either (i) change their 
earnings management practices to reduce the impact of counterparty risk on their balance sheet; or 
alternatively, (ii) counterparty firms could sever or eliminate their link from firms in the core periphery 
before contagion spreads. On the other hand, managers of firms in the core periphery are less likely to 
take into account the impact of their earnings management practices on the balance sheet of firms in the 
outer periphery in the network-system.  
4.2. Regulated Networks and Income Smoothing.  
In regulated networks13, regulators aim to promote the stability of firms in a networked-system. One way 
regulators can achieve this objective is to monitor closely the behaviour of firms in the core-periphery in 
the network-system. Regulatory pressure on firms in the core periphery will compel managers of such 
firms to adopt earnings management techniques that align their behaviour with the stability objectives of 
regulators who want to promote stability in the networked-system; therefore, the desirable earnings 
management technique is one that helps to stabilise the system and improve the resilience of the network. 
Of all the common earnings management techniques, one common form of earnings management linked 
to firm stability and the stability of the overall system is ‘income smoothing’. Income smoothing practices 
allow managers to smooth earnings over time by reducing too high earnings and increasing too low 
                                                          
12 This view goes contrary to the classic view that firms compete against each other. Rather, we argue that this will 
not be case if firms exist in a system where firms understand that the collapse of a highly-connected firm can lead 
to the collapse or near-collapse of other firms connected to it, directly or indirectly. 
13 Given that regulators are aware that the system has evolved into a complex network, one objective of 
regulation in complex and fragile networks would be take steps that promote overall stability in the network-
system. 
earnings so that reported earning is never too high or too low. Income smoothing may take the form of 
income-decreasing earnings management to lower excessive profit or may take the form of income-
increasing earnings management to increase too-low profit, so that reported earnings are never too high or 
too low to avoid sending unintended signals to counterparties. Further still, the incentive to smooth 
income may be driven by explicit contracts14 and managerial opportunistic15 behaviour. In networks, the 
incentive to smooth income may also be influenced by (i) the position of the firm in the network and (ii) 
the centrality of the firm in the network. By position of the firm, we mean the exact position or location of 
the firm in the network: either at the inner core periphery or at the outer periphery. By network centrality, 
we mean the degree of interconnection of a firm relative to other firms - some firms are more 
interconnected than others.  
4.2.1. Network Centrality and Income Smoothing  
Network centrality refers to the degree of interconnection of a firm relative to other firms in the network - 
some firms are more interconnected than others. We propose that the extent of income smoothing practice 
in complex networks is positively related to the centrality of firms in the network-system. This is because 
when a firm becomes increasingly central to the system due to its extensive interconnection with multiple 
firms, regulators will increase its scrutiny and monitoring of highly interconnected firms in the core 
periphery. To avoid such scrutiny and monitoring, firms in the core periphery will prefer to use 
accounting techniques to smooth profits over time because income smoothing promotes firm stability, 
promotes the stability of the network/system and it align with the stability objectives of industry (or 
network) regulators16. Although some regulators can see through income smoothing (mainly, accrual-
based income smoothing)17, regulators may not take actions against highly-connected firms that smooth 
income because such income smoothing behaviour aligns with the stability expectation of industry 
supervisors/regulators. Overall, the main argument here is that firms in the inner core of an interconnected 
and regulated network-system are more likely to rely on income smoothing behaviour as a preferred form 
of earnings management.  
4.2.2. Trade-off: Earnings Management Choices versus Network Centrality.  
Apart from income smoothing, there are other earnings management alternatives available to managers of 
firms in the core periphery of the network-system. However, the earnings management techniques that 
managers of firms in the core periphery can adopt should decrease as the firm’s network-centrality 
increases in the networked-system. This is because, as the network centrality of a firm increases in a 
regulated network-system, the manager will narrow his earnings management strategies to strategies that 
stabilise firm performance over time particularly when managers anticipate shocks to the system that 
might affect the firm, and when managers anticipate (and want to avoid) the negative publicity that 
follows fault-finding by regulators. On the other hand, the earnings management techniques available to 
managers of firms with lower network-centrality increases as firms’ network-centrality decreases in the 
network-system because the actions of the managers of such firms are less likely to pose any significant 
                                                          
14 4 Such as: the need to receive bonus plans, avoid debt-covenant violation, avoid the political cost of reporting 
too high profits 
15 For example, the need to save the managers’ job, etc 
16 See Assumption 9 
17 Cohen and Zarowin (2008) show that regulators can see through accrual based earnings management compared 
to real earnings management, and accruals reverse over time. 
systemic concern to the stability of the entire network-system partly because they are connected by fewer 
claims compared to firms in the core periphery of the network-system. Hence, managers of firms with low 
network centrality will have more opportunity to use a wide range of earnings management strategies 
because they face less scrutiny by regulators; therefore, managers of such firms are not constrained to rely 
solely on income smoothing techniques although it is also an available option to them. From the 
reasoning above, two premise can be drawn. One, there is an inverse relationship between a firm’s 
network centrality and the number of earnings management techniques the firm manager can adopt in a 
regulated network-system. Two, there is a positive relationship between a firm’s network centrality and 
the propensity to use income smoothing strategies in regulated networked-systems, assuming 
regulators/supervisors are concerned about the stability of the networked-system.  
4.3. Why Core-periphery Firms Smooth Income 
4.3.1. Maintain Implied Reputation 
We have established that, over time, the concentration of financial and non-financial claims and 
obligations around fewer firms give rise to ‘highly-connected firms’, and these firms are located in the 
core periphery of a network-system. However, interconnectedness can have implication for reputation. 
The concentration of claims and obligations around these few firms may signal that firms in the core 
periphery have had a long standing reputation of honouring their obligations and claims over the years 
and, therefore, many firms are willing to do business with firms in the core periphery, which further 
increases their network connectivity and their network centrality in the system. A manager’s awareness of 
his firm’s ‘too-interconnected’ position in the network/system can be a source of reputation to the firm, 
and the manager can have strong incentives to engage in income smoothing practices to maintain the 
firm’s reputation in the network-system. For instance, the manager of a firm in the core periphery can 
anticipate that reporting significant losses or significant shortfall in earnings would send a bad signal (or 
bad news) to its counterparties and erode the confidence of counterparties in doing business with the firm, 
therefore, the manager will have incentives to smooth earnings upward to avoid reporting losses which 
helps them to avoid reporting bad news and to reassure counterparties of the firm’s commitment to meet 
its obligations, thus, reinforcing its reputable position (or centrality) in the network-system.  
4.3.2. To Avoid Regulatory Scrutiny 
In a network-system where firms have a history of circumventing regulations and regulators are keen on 
fault finding, managers of firms in the core periphery will prefer to smooth income to avoid excessive 
scrutiny by firm regulators and to avoid attracting political noise to the firm. For instance, a firm that 
reports high profits may face backlash from the general public. The general public may protest against the 
firm’s huge profit claiming that customers (or depositors, in the case of banks) were exploited. Such claim 
could attract negative commentaries from several interest groups including human rights activists, anti-
corruption groups and politicians. Politicians, in response, will pressure industry regulators and 
supervisors to thoroughly scrutinise the accounting numbers of firms in the core periphery. Because such 
scrutiny is costly to firms in the core periphery, such firms may take actions to avoid this cost. One of 
such action is to smooth their profits, that is, to make earnings not too high not too low. On the other 
hand, firms in the outer periphery may also smooth profits to avoid excessive regulatory monitoring but 
the extent of income smoothing will be higher for firms in the core periphery compared to firms in the 
outer periphery because firms in the outer periphery face less scrutiny from regulators compared to firms 
in the core periphery.  
 
5. Conclusion 
This article presents a perspective on earnings management in interconnected networks. We employ 
network typology to provide insights into the earnings management behaviour of firms in interconnected 
network-systems. We propose a network-based earnings management framework, and argue that (i) firms 
in the core periphery of an interconnected and regulated network-system are more likely to rely on 
income smoothing behaviour as a preferred form of earnings management because it promotes firm 
stability, the stability of the network-system and it aligns with the stability objectives of industry 
regulators. Also, we propose and argue that there is an inverse relationship between a firm’s network 
centrality and the number of earnings management techniques a manager can adopt when firms are in a 
regulated network-system. Further, we propose and argue that there is a positive relationship between a 
firm’s network centrality and the propensity to use income smoothing strategies when regulators are 
concerned about the stability in the network-system. Also, the framework demonstrates that firms in the 
core periphery may smooth income to maintain their reputation and/or to avoid excessive regulatory 
scrutiny. For policy purpose, the perspective we provide in this article can help regulators to better 
understand the earnings management practices of systemic (or highly-interconnected) firms. Insights from 
the proposed framework in this article may guide and inform future standard-setting policies on the 
financial reporting behaviour of systemic firms both in the financial and non-financial sector. Finally, one 
limitation of using network-based frameworks to understand managerial behaviour, for instance earnings 
management, is that it ignores the conflict of interest between boards and managers. Secondly, while the 
framework we adopt in this article argues that the extent of earnings management differs between firms in 
the core and outer periphery in a network, it does not specify whether the preferred earnings management 
strategy in networks are accrual-based or real activity-based, that is, it is not clear whether income 
smoothing behaviour of firms in the core periphery of a network is accrual-based or real activity-based. 
Future research can provide some insight into these issues. 
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